According to a familiar reading of Kant, he denies the possibility alleged by the rationalists of our having non-sensible or intellectual intuition. I argue in this article that he simply holds the possibility to be groundless. To put the contrast in terms of a distinction Kant makes in the A-Paralogisms, he raises a “dogmatic” objection to the rationalists in the former case, and a “critical” one in the latter. By analyzing the two-step argument in the B-Deduction, I defend the “critical” (...) reading, which may, I hope, shed light on how Kant can justify his claim – which may be regarded as a second-order, methodological one pivotal to his Critical project – that possible experience serves as the only guideline for proving that we can cognize objects a priori. (shrink)

This chapter presents an interpretation of Kant’s view on public reason. For Kant, reason in its theoretical use is the highest of our mental powers, giving principles for thinking in general that regulate our use of understanding as a faculty of cognition. In its practical use, it is a capacity to set ends to oneself and to pursue them by efficient means. Kant calls reason our “rational nature” and also employs the word ‘humanity’ as a technical term for it. Most (...) importantly, we find him saying toward the end of the Critique of Pure Reason, “The very existence of reason depends on this freedom [to communicate with others], which has no dictatorial authority, but whose claim is never more than the agreement of free citizens, each of whom must be able to express his reservations, indeed even his veto, without holding back”. In other words, for Kant, reason is essentially public. Thus, no philosophy that deserves to be called “Kantian” can be “monological” or “solipsistic,” as Habermas has depicted it. To interpret Kant’s view on public reason is therefore something like exposing the kernel of his entire critical approach to reason, both theoretical and practical. The goal of this chapter is to bring Kant’s view on public reason to bear on our thinking about how controversial bioethical matters in social debate are to be addressed through public deliberation, and what, if any, conditions ought to be designed and instituted under which such deliberation can proceed fairly and thereby achieve reasonable agreement, if not consensus. (shrink)

The articles in this collection were all selected from the first five volumes of the Journal of Dialectics of Nature published by the Chinese Academy of Sciences between 1979 and 1985. The Journal was established in 1979 as a comprehensive theoretical publication concerning the history, philosophy and sociology of the natural sciences. It began publication as a response to China's reform, particularly the policy of opening to the outside world. Chinese scholars began to undertake distinctive, original research in these fields. (...) This collection provides a cross-section of their efforts during the initial phase. To enable western scholars to understand the historical process of this change in Chinese academics, Yu Guangyuan's `On the Emancipation of the Mind' and Xu Liangying's `Essay on the Role of Science and Democracy in Society' have been included in this collection. Three of the papers included on the philosophy of science are discussions of philosophical issues in cosmology and biology by scientists themselves. The remaining four are written by philosophers of science and discuss information and cognition, homeostasis and Chinese traditional medicine, the I Ching (Yi Jing) and mathematics, etc. Papers have been selected on the history of both classical and modern science and technology, the most distinctive of which are macro-comparisons of the development of science in China and the west. Some papers discuss the issue of the demarcation of periods in the history of science, the history of ancient Chinese mathematics, astronomy, metallurgy, machinery, medicine, etc. Others discuss the history of modern physics and biology, the history of historiography of science in China and the history of regional development of Chinese science and technology. Also included are biographies of three post-eighteenth-century Chinese scholars, Li Shanlan (1811-1882), Hua Hengfang (1833–1902), and Cai Yuanpei (1868–1940), who contributed greatly to the introduction of western science and scholarship to China. In addition, three short papers have been included introducing the interactions between Chinese scholars and three great western scientists, Niels Bohr, Norbert Wiener, and Robert A. Millikan. (shrink)

本书依据生态学原理,生态哲学价值观,世界观和方法论以及教育生态学等理论,试图探索中国外语教育生态发展的途径与方法.所谓生态,是指生物在一定的自然环境条件下生存和发展的状态.

Tian-tai Buddhism and Hua-yan Buddhism can be viewed as the two most philosophically important schools in Chinese Buddhism. The Tian-tai school was founded by Zhi-yi (Chih-i) (538-597 A.D.). The major Buddhist text endorsed by this school is the Lotus Sutra, short for “the Sutra of the Lotus Blossom of the Subtle Dharma.” Hua-yan Buddhism derived its name from the Hua-yan Sutra, translated as “The Flower Ornament Scripture” or as “The Flowery Splendor Scripture.”1 The founder of the Hua-yan school was a (...) Chinese monk named Du-shun (557-640 A.D.). The second patriarch of Hua-yan is Zhi-yan (602-668 A.D.), who studied with Du-shun. However, it is generally acknowledged that the real founder of Hua-yan Buddhism is its third patriarch, Fa-zang (643-712 A.D.). He introduced the division of “the Realm of Principle” and “the Realm of Things,”2 which was developed by Hua-yan’s fourth patriarch Cheng-guan (738-839? A.D.) into the defining thesis for Hua-yan Buddhism – the “four dharma realms”: the Realm of Principle, the Realm of Things,3 the Realm of the Noninterference between Principle and Things, and the Realm of the Noninterference of All Things. (shrink)

Ben shu gong fen san bu: di yi bu hui gui zhen wo, di er bu hui gui tian di, di san bu hui gui tai ji. Nei rong bao kuo: lun sheng ming; sheng ming yu shi ge; sheng ming yu yin yue; xian dai ren sheng ming de yan bian; wo shi shui, tian di yu wo deng.

本書從多維度研究了國外意識形態新變化，即從傳統意識形態的新變化、當代新出現的意識形態、社會主義意識形態的新發展、蘇共意識形態的終結及其原因等維度，對當代國外意識形態從實踐到理論、從宏觀到微觀、從內容到 形式、從類型到結構、從特徵到功能、從存在方式到傳播方式、從形成機制到作用機制、從研究視角到研究方法等方面進行較全面的研究，分析了國外意識形態新變化對我國主流意識形態建設的影響、挑戰與啟迪，並對我國社會 主義意識形態建設策略提出建議。.

本书从唐君毅先生提出的“中国艺术精神”开始论述,分析了中国艺术精神的多层面向进而深入分析其阐释的意义;继而,本书对徐复观先生深入的研究进行了解读和探索,一直延续到今日学界的研究和探索,并对“中国艺术精 神”在世纪之交时发生的转向给出了结论.

Building on the strengths of the first edition, the second edition of the Irwin Nicomachean Ethics features a revised translation (with little editorial intervention), expanded notes (including a summary of the argument of each chapter), an expanded Introduction, and a revised glossary.

What can we learn about management ethics from other cultures and societies? In this textbook, cross-cultural management theory is applied and made relevant to management ethics. To help the reader understand different approaches that global businesses can take to operate successfully and ethically, there are chapters focusing on specific countries and regions. As well as giving the wider geographical, political and cultural contexts, the book includes numerous examples in every chapter to help the reader critique universal assumptions of what is (...) ethical. By taking a closer look at the way we view other cultures and their values, the author challenges us to rethink commonly held assumptions and approaches in cross-cultural management, and to apply a more critical approach. (shrink)

Moral realism of a paradigmatic sort -- Defending the parallel -- The parity premise -- Epistemic nihilism -- Epistemic expressivism : traditional views -- Epistemic expressivism : nontraditional views -- Epistemic reductionism -- Three objections to the core argument.

Many philosophers hold antirealist views about morality, according to which moral facts or truths do not exist. Does this imply that other types of normative facts, such as epistemic facts, do not exist? The Normative Web develops a positive answer to this question. By means of an analogy between moral and epistemic facts, Terence Cuneo presents a compelling defence of robust realism in ethics. In so doing, he engages with a range of antirealist positions in epistemology such as error (...) theories, expressivist views, and reductionist views of epistemic reasons. (shrink)